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ABSTRACT
Focusing on the institutional aspects of the Kurdish women’s
movement in Turkey since the 1990s the article shows how
it established a consciousness within the Kurdish national
movement that gender equality is a cornerstone of democ-
racy and ethnic rights. We frame this through theories of
enacting intersectional multilayered citizenship and identify
three key interventions: autonomous women’s assemblies,
women’s quotas in pro-Kurdish rights parties and the co-
chair system where all elected positions within the pro-
Kurdish parties are jointly occupied by a male and female.
These have achieved a better representation of women in
formal politics, rendered gender equality and sexual violence
legitimate subjects of politics and contributed to establish-
ing an aspiration for a more dialogic political ethos. While
the women’s movement’s close affiliation with the Kurdish
national movement has been highly effective, it also in part
circumscribes gender roles to fit its agendas.
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Introduction
In the recent conflict with extremist Islamist groups in the Middle East, the
image of the Kurdish woman fighter has become iconic, symbolising a secu-
lar, self-confident Middle Eastern femininity, opposed to Islamization. Yet,
few beyond the Kurdish community and area studies specialists, are aware of
the long history of Kurdish women’s activism, without which these recent
interventions of Kurdish women as fighters and organizers against Islamist
violence would not have been possible.
While Kurdish women have been politically active for a long time, in the
mobilizations for democratic and ethnic rights since the 1990s they came to
form a mass movement challenging not only ethnic, but also gender oppres-
sion. The article begins by providing some background on Kurds in Turkey,
CONTACT Umut Erel umut.erel@open.ac.uk Faculty of Social Sciences, The Open University, Walton
Hall, Milton Keynes MK7 6AA, UK
 2019 The Author(s). Published by Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group
This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (http://
creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium,
provided the original work is properly cited.
GENDER, PLACE & CULTURE
https://doi.org/10.1080/0966369X.2019.1596883
to then present the methods, moving on to theorize enacting intersectional
multilayered citizenship. We then examine how the Kurdish women’s move-
ment established institutions and processes of increasing women’s participa-
tion and representation in formal politics, focusing on three enactments of
citizenship: women’s assemblies, quotas and the co-chair system. While
acknowledging that the Kurdish national movement has played an ambiva-
lent role, both instrumentalising and promoting women’s rights, the article
concludes that the Kurdish women’s movement has enacted intersectional
multilayered citizenship by challenging gendered, ethnic and class oppres-
sions on the levels of family, locality, the Kurdish national movement, as well
as the Turkish state, in the process transforming understandings of who can
become a political subject, which topics can legitimately become part of
public political deliberation, and who can claim rights.
Background
Kurds are a ‘non-state nation’ (Mojab 2001), spanning territories in Turkey,
Syria, Iraq and Iran, where they have been variously subjected to genocide
in a long history of denial of their Kurdish identity (Ayata and Hakyemez
2013; Skutnabb-Kangas and Fernandes 2008). Kurdish identity in Turkey, or
what many Kurds claim as North Kurdistan (Keles 2015), has been highly con-
tested, making it difficult or even illegal to claim Kurdish identity throughout
long periods of the republic’s history (McDowall 2007; Keles 2015). From the
inception of the Turkish Republic in 1923, the Kurds had a problematic rela-
tionship with the state, as Kurdish ethnic identity has not been recognized,
and subjected to assimilationist policies. This included the criminalization of
the language and Kurdish names, the violent suppression of revolts in the
1920s and 30s and forced deportations to the west of the country.
Since the 1980s, there has been an armed conflict between the Turkish
state and the Kurdish Workers’ Party (PKK), during which 40,000 people have
been killed and more than 1 million Kurds been subjected to forced internal
displacement (ECRI 2011). Furthermore, pro-Kurdish political parties, journal-
ists and intellectuals have been subjected to prosecution and extra-judicial
killings, especially during the 1990s (Zeydanlıoglu 2008). Abdullah €Ocalan,
the leader of the PKK, the most prominent but outlawed Kurdish party
involved in armed struggle against the Turkish state, was captured in 1999
and has been in solitary confinement since. In the meantime, a number of
initiatives, most recently the ‘Kurdish opening’ in 2009, aimed at improving
cultural and linguistic rights such as the decriminalization of Kurdish lan-
guage in public and the introduction of Kurdish broadcasting (G€unes¸ 2012;
Keles 2015). Yet, many key issues such as mother tongue teaching and a sys-
tematic democratization and adherence to human rights have not been
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realized. Kurdish political projects range from independence, the creation of
a Kurdish state spanning territories in contemporary Iran, Iraq, Syria and
Turkey, to demands for federation and political and cultural rights within the
existing borders of Turkey, or a form of regional autonomy within a pro-
jected new federal structure of Turkey (Akkaya and Jongerden 2014). Indeed,
the Kurdish national movement in Turkey has evolved from beginnings in
the 1970s in communist and anti-colonial ideologies, through to a stronger
emphasis on nationalism which de-emphasised some communist principles
(such as anti-religiosity) and instead aimed to bring all social and political
sections of Kurdish society into a national liberation struggle in the 1990s
and since the 2000s has emphasised Democratic Confederalism (G€unes¸
2012). Each of these ideological, organizational and political shifts impacted
the conceptualisation of gender relations and their centrality to Kurdish
nationalist politics (C¸aglayan 2012). Currently, the Kurdish national move-
ment in Rojava (Syria) while embroiled in a conflict with Islamist groups, is
realizing a social revolution. While Western media mostly engage with the
perceived novelty of Kurdish women fighters, this social revolution addresses
all areas of social life, including environmental, political and economic
changes. One of the key aims is to overcome patriarchal social organization.
While beyond the scope of this article, many of the gender politics discussed
here are also realized in Rojava (Tank 2017). Developing from the 1970s, the
Kurdish women’s movement’s aims, organizational structures and ideologies
evolved; key moments were the entry of women into the guerrilla, where
they proved their significance for the wider Kurdish national movement, and
developed ideologically through women’s academies and consciousness-rais-
ing (Ac¸ık 2003, 2013; Bozgan 2011). The most recent innovative ideological
intervention has been the framework of ‘Jineolojȋ’, aiming to understand the
historical roots of women’s oppression from a Kurdish point of view (rather
than drawing on Western feminisms) and developing a future-oriented polit-
ical project of a world beyond hierarchies and oppression within the wider
project of Democratic Federalism (D€OKH and DWAA 2013; €Ocalan 2013).
While women-only spaces facilitated these developments, the Kurdish
women’s movement also engaged the Kurdish national movement’s mixed-
gender political structures, contributing to, and at times leading its political
campaigns (C¸aglayan 2007; Bozgan 2011).
Although engaging with these different political projects is beyond the
scope of this article, it is important to underline that the Kurdish national
movement is not monolithic. The turbulent nature of the politics of Kurdish
rights means that the situation on the ground is fast changing. While recog-
nizing the important roles of the Diaspora, contributions of women in highly
visible leadership positions and in the armed struggle for a fuller understand-
ing of the Kurdish women’s movement, because of limited space, here we
GENDER, PLACE & CULTURE 3
focus on the process of institutionalization of the Kurdish women’s move-
ment, an aspect neglected in academic publications so far. This speaks to a
number of concerns in women’s activism in the region and transnationally.
While most recently, the Arab Spring has resulted in a backlash against
women’s public activism (Esfandari 2012), state sponsored institutionalized
women’s movements in the Middle East have often appropriated women’s
rights agendas to prove that the governments they have been affiliated with
profess modern values of gender relations to the West, rather than genuine
interventions into gendered power relations (e.g. al-Ali and Pratt 2011;
Hatem 1994; Kandiyoti 1989). Different tensions between institutionalized
and grassroots women’s activism are also evident in Western countries
(Outshoorn 1994). On the other hand, we are currently witnessing how
rightwing discourses argue that women’s rights are a particularly Western
achievement, incompatible with non-Western cultural values to justify racism,
particularly directed against (migrants from) Muslim majority countries, of
which Kurds are part (Farris 2017). Against this backdrop, the Kurdish wom-
en’s movement’s experiences of combining institutionalization with grass-
roots activism, while also critically interrogating intersectional power
relations of class, ethnicity, sexuality and the relationship with the environ-
ment can provide insights into alternative configurations of women’s activ-
ism. The Kurdish women’s movement’s decolonial project for gender equality
also challenges the idea that women’s rights constitute a Western value.
Method
This article is based on qualitative research, including extensive documentary
analysis, in-depth semi-structured interviews and observations. In-depth
interviews with eight women’s rights activists in Kurdish-populated
Diyarbakir were conducted between January 2014 and May 2015, in par-
ticipants’ organizations, homes, and in cafes, ranging 45–130minutes.
Interviews were transcribed, coded, analysed, identifying key themes through
a grounded theorizing approach (Hammersley 2010). Most interviewees held
leading positions in a range of women’s organizations, but we also included
two grassroots activists. In addition, informal interviews and observations
were undertaken at eight Kurdish women’s organizations of diverse political
and social orientation in Diyarbakir.
Document analysis of primary and secondary data provided ‘background
and context, additional questions to be asked, supplementary data, a means
of tracking change and development, and verification of findings’ from inter-
views (Bowen 2009, 30). We analysed public organizational statements,
newsletters and pamphlets of women’s groups and organizations from the
1990s to present and newspaper articles on specific themes: the history,
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organizational practices and structures of the Kurdish women’s movement,
the relationship of the Kurdish and other women’s movements and femin-
ism, in particular to Turkish women’s movement, sexual and domestic vio-
lence and resistance to this. The analysis used ‘directed content analysis’,
combining categories emerging from prior research with categories emerg-
ing from the data (Hsieh and Shannon 2005). Concepts identified in prior
research draw on publications on the Kurdish women’s movement (cf.
C¸aglayan 2007, 2012; Bozgan 2011) and Ac¸ık’s (2003, 2013) extensive dis-
course analysis of publications of the Kurdish national and women’s move-
ment. We employed the Popular Memory Group’s (1982) analytic notion of
structural and cultural readings. Structural readings can provide factual data
that are not – or only partially – recorded otherwise, elucidating the chal-
lenges of realizing new political and organizational structures (see below our
interviewee Avs¸ȋn’s comments on challenges to the co-chair system). These
structural readings intertwine with cultural readings attentive to how Kurdish
women give meaning to these experiences. For example, analysing the intro-
duction of women’s quotas combines cultural and structural readings: we
show how this change in political representational structure was closely
intertwined with challenging gendered, ethnic stereotypes of Kurdish women
as tribal, backward, and uneducated.
Bringing Kurdish women’s struggles to feminist debates beyond area stud-
ies is important to learn empirically about a group long rendered invisible
and contributes to a decolonial project bringing knowledges from the South
to international theorizing (Mignolo 2012). Requiring a critical, self-reflexive
effort of translation (Gutierrez-Rodrıguez 2010), the research draws on multi-
lingual primary sources in Kurdish (Kurmanji), Turkish, German and English.
While acknowledging the diversity of Kurdish women’s groups this article
focuses on those affiliated with the mainstream Kurdish national movement
close to the PKK and legal pro-Kurdish rights parties. We refer to pro-Kurdish
rights parties in the plural; since the 1990s pro-Kurdish rights parties were
frequently outlawed but reorganized under different names, to effectively
continue their political work. Each successor party emerged with a reformed
party programme. These parties are the main legal actors representing the
Kurdish movement, including: HEP (People’s Work Party, 1990–1993), DEP
(Democracy Party, 1991/1993–1994), HADEP (People’s Democracy Party,
1994–2003), DEHAP (Democratic People’s Party established in 1997 but active
only after HADEP was banned in 2003), DTP (Democratic Society Party,
2005–2009), BDP (Peace and Democracy Party, 2008–2014), DBP (Democratic
Regions Party, 2014 –to date) and HDP (Peoples’ Democratic Party, 2012-to
date). While this limits the range of practices we attend to, it is justified by
the numerical significance of this part of the Kurdish women’s movement.
Nonetheless, some of the limitations of the mainstream Kurdish national
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movement, such as a conditional willingness to enter transversal politics
with other Kurdish political parties, hierarchical structures and strict party dis-
cipline also characterise the Kurdish women’s movement (cf. €Ozg€okc¸e 2011).
More research on the diverse parts of the Kurdish women’s movement is
needed for a fuller picture.
Multilayered intersectional citizenship: theoretically framing the
Kurdish women’s movement
We conceptualize citizenship as a struggle for rights, representation, belong-
ing and participation, where those social and political actors, challenging
existing injustices are central to transforming exclusionary practices and con-
ceptions of citizenship (Abraham et al. 2010; Erel 2016; Lister 2008).
Furthermore, we draw on theoretical work on ‘acts of citizenship’, disrupting
normative notions of who counts as a citizen and what constitutes legitimate
rights, bringing about new understandings of the political, new subjects of
citizenship and new forms of doing politics (Isin 2012). This is in contrast
and opposition to how the Turkish state has defined citizenship closely
based on national belonging; where Kurds, and other ethnic and religious
others, have only been included on condition they assimilate while denying
Kurdishness, victimising those refusing assimilation. Kurdish claims to ethnic
identity have long been criminalized as undermining Turkish citizenship
(Yegen 2009).
We draw on Yuval-Davis’s (1999) argument that citizenship is a multi-
layered construct:
in which one’s citizenship in collectivities in the different layers – local, ethnic,
national, state, cross- or trans-state and supra-state – is affected and often at least
partly constructed by the relationships and positionings of each layer in specific
historical context. This is of particular importance if we want to examine citizenship
in a gendered non-westocentric way (1999, 119).
Paying attention to the multilayeredness of citizenship challenges westo-
centric notions that the nation-state’s relationship to individuals determines
the meaning of citizenship. Instead, participation, belonging, power relations
and boundary-making in each layer are recognized as important aspects of
citizenship. This is significant in non-Western contexts where the nation-state
may be challenged both by traditional social structures, as well as
multi-nationals, and international organizations. The notion of multilayered
citizenship acknowledges that for those from minority national groupings,
citizenship relates ‘as much to membership in their own community or the
neighbouring nations as to the states where they live’ (Yuval-Davis 1999,
124). The state of struggle between the national minority and majority is key
for understanding the citizenship of collectivities such as Kurds engaged in
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minority national projects (1999:127). A multilayered understanding also rec-
ognizes the role of transnational citizenship, which is relevant for the Kurdish
context, where Diasporas were important in realizing cultural rights such as
the standardization and teaching of Kurdish language to migrants in
Sweden, or the development of Kurdish media in Belgium (Keles 2015).
Diasporas also played an important role in gender equality struggles
(Siqueira de Miranda 2015). Multilayered citizenship helps theorize the
Kurdish women’s movement’s struggle for new forms of community beyond
the nation-state, encompassing the Kurdish national community, not repre-
sented by a state, and also local multi-ethnic communities. In particular since
the 2000s multi-ethnic and multi-cultural local autonomy and governance
have become a focus of Kurdish politics, contradicting the Turkish nation-
state’s claims to ethnic homogeneity. In addition, as a non-state nation
spread across the territory of four nation-states, Kurds also have significant
trans-border attachments and socio-political relationships (van Bruinessen
2000), e.g. the strong mutual influence of gender politics of Kurds in Turkey
and Syria.
We combine Yuval-Davis’ concept of multilayered citizenship with her
approach to situated intersectionality (2015) to theorize how different social
divisions mutually constitute each other. The situated intersectionality per-
spective acknowledges the role of context and particular social and historical
configurations to examine complex social relations, enabling comprehensive
analysis of social inequalities: we explore unequal participation and belong-
ing along the social divisions of gender, ethnicity, class, rural-urban origin,
religious identity, though the focus is on gender and ethnicity, enabling ana-
lysis of inequalities within and between women. While
in concrete situations the different social divisions constitute each other, they are
irreducible to each other – each of them has a different ontological discourse of
particular dynamics of power relations of exclusion and/or exploitation, using a
variety of legitimate and illegitimate technologies of inferiorizations, intimidations
and sometimes actual violence to achieve this. (2015:94).
While gendered social divisions are defined ontologically through relations
of sexuality and reproduction, ethnic social divisions are constructed by par-
ticular cultural boundaries (Yuval-Davis 2015). This approach acknowledges
that particular social divisions, such as gender, ethnicity, class or education,
can have different meanings in different spaces and contexts: the social pos-
ition of ‘Kurdish woman’ can have conflicting meanings, such as in some
Kurdish rights contexts, as guardian of Kurdish culture, or, from the perspec-
tive of Turkish state intervention as lacking education or cultural capital. A
situated intersectional analysis is also attentive to the pluriversal epistemolo-
gies of ‘situated gazes of particular people in relation to their own social
locations and social well-being’ (Yuval-Davis 2015, 97). The intersection of
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gender and ethnicity is an important arena of domination and resistance for
national liberation movements. This situated intersectional approach has
been chosen to analyse the multiple layers of belonging and participation
constitutive of the citizenship practices of ethnically marginalized women;
from the intimate sphere of the family, to the local, the national, trans-
national and the supra-national, different sites and relationships are involved
in conferring – or withholding – recognition, rights and entitlements (Erel
2016). Yet, beyond formal notions of citizenship, we propose that ethnically
marginalized women are not simply passive objects of states, communities
or families, but contest forms of exclusion, struggle for participation and
negotiate over who counts as a legitimate political subject. In these proc-
esses they become political subjects, despite and against their economic, cul-
tural, and political gendered and ethnic marginalization and oppression (Erel
2013, 2016). As members of a marginalized ethnic minority, Kurdish women
in Turkey experience a devaluation of their cultural resources, as their gen-
dered experience of educational and economic deprivation does not equip
them with the cultural capital that legitimises them as competent citizens.
Furthermore, the hardships of the Turkish-Kurdish conflict have reified wom-
en’s already difficult access to the public sphere. For decades, state policy
has rendered Kurdish women increasingly vulnerable to gendered ethnic vio-
lence, viewed their language as illegal - more recently, illegitimate - in pub-
lic. As a consequence of the conflict, families have lost their livelihoods,
many fleeing into cities in the Kurdish regions or other parts of Turkey and
into the Diaspora (Keles 2015). The conflict and consequent economic depri-
vations have also made the reproductive tasks with which women have trad-
itionally been charged, more difficult to fulfil (IFWF 2007). In the following
we explore how the Kurdish women’s movement produced new forms of
intersectional multilayered citizenship for Kurdish women.
Women’s representation in formal politics
The intensified political and military conflict of the 1990s affected the every-
day lives of Kurdish women in a myriad of ways. The repressions of that
period had a contradictory effect, on one hand criminalising and rendering
high-risk any form of pro-Kurdish rights political activism, on the other, con-
tributing to a mass politicisation of women personally affected (Bozgan
2011). During the 1990s and 2000s pro-Kurdish rights parties were regularly
criminalised, and closed down, however Kurdish activists quickly responded
by establishing new successor political parties. We argue that each time a
new party was formed, women activists used this to institutionalize more far-
reaching gender equality policies. In the early 2000s, when the political cli-
mate in Turkey allowed for an expansion of civil society organizations, the
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Kurdish women’s movement entered a new stage. Kurdish women’s organi-
zations were able to operate legally and became part of an expanding repre-
sentation of pro-Kurdish rights parties in local and national government.
The grassroots mobilisation of the pro-Kurdish rights parties was to a
great extent carried out by women activists. They initially formed informal
‘women’s commissions’, which subsequently became women’s branches of
the pro-Kurdish rights parties. At the November 2000 HADEP party confer-
ence, the women’s branches established autonomous structures within the
party and introduced “positive support” measures to improve women’s rep-
resentation in formal politics. Discursively, emphasis shifted from the 1990s
framing of “women’s rights” to “gender inequality” as exemplified by the
DEHAP (2003) party programme which defined gender inequality as a key
concern of contemporary societies, making its elimination a key party object-
ive with equal priority to the solution of the Kurdish issues.
As pro-Kurdish parties’ representation in the Turkish parliament increased
and many municipalities and local and regional governments in the Kurdish
areas are run by them, the gender composition of politics in Turkey has
changed (cf. G€unes¸ 2012, C¸aglayan 2006). Their multilayered citizenship activ-
ism has changed the relationship between Kurdish women and the Turkish
state, where they have claimed recognition as ethnically distinctive political
subjects. However, this activism has also changed Kurdish women’s citizen-
ship with respect to establishing the Kurdish women’s movement as an
important political actor within the Kurdish national movement (cf. C¸aglayan
2007). As a consequence, they have been able to consolidate recognition of
injustice of women’s oppression within the level of the kin group and family
as well. This shows how Kurdish women’s citizenship is ‘affected and (… ) at
least partly constructed by the relationships and positionings of each layer in
specific historical context.’ (Yuval-Davis 1999, 94). From an intersectional per-
spective this also shows how women’s highly visible involvement in claiming
ethnic rights vis-a-vis the state, has strengthened their ability to realize their
gendered rights vis-a-vis the Kurdish community, on the level of formal polit-
ics, within the local community and the family. In the following we explore
in-depth three rights-claiming activities significant for developing Kurdish
women’s intersectional, multilayered citizenship acts; autonomous women’s
assemblies, a woman’s quota and the co-chair system.
Autonomous women’s assemblies
Women’s informal activism in the early 1990s became more institutionalized
through women’s assemblies with a nested structure from village or neigh-
bourhood, town, region, to national level. Membership of women’s assem-
blies is open to all women. They work bottom-up, with neighbourhoods
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electing representatives to the district who in turn elect representatives to
regional women’s assemblies. Representatives from regional women’s assem-
blies meet annually at the nationwide women’s conference. The effectiveness
of these women’s assemblies can be understood through a framework of
intersectional multilayered citizenship.
The neighbourhood women’s assemblies work independently from the
regional assemblies, responding to local issues and events, for example, this
might be to intervene in a domestic violence case by suspending the male
perpetrator from the party. The district and regional women’s assemblies
cannot intervene into local work, but the neighbourhood women’s assembly
can call upon them to support their work e.g. through setting up a spe-
cial commission.
A solution oriented commission, a mediating commission. There will be members
of the women’s assembly on the commission, but depending on the circumstances,
there may be a specialist lawyer, or a psychologist (… ) that commission will carry
out its work and report back to the regional women’s assembly. But the
neighbourhood women’s assembly will be the one to address the problem. (Avs¸ȋn)
This responsiveness to local issues characterises the enacting of citizenship
as embedded in multiple layers of the family, the local community, the
Kurdish national movement and also their relationship with the Turkish state,
so that the nested structure of women’s assemblies has become an effective
vehicle for Kurdish women’s citizenship. Women’s assemblies have helped to
bring personal relations, such as within the family, to a public arena where
they can be challenged politically. This challenged the boundaries of public
and private, thereby enacting citizenship; they challenged gendered alloca-
tion of women’s experiences of oppression within the family as ‘non-political’
by posing the problem of domestic violence as a public question of oppres-
sion, challenging a narrow conception of what counts as political and where
women’s citizenship is expressed. The women’s assemblies constitute an
important resource for women to address gender based violence and gen-
der-specific concerns in the locality. It has also affected the conduct of polit-
ics in mixed-gender Kurdish organizations and pro-Kurdish rights parties.
A striking point demonstrating the strength of women’s assemblies within
the pro-Kurdish parties is that decisions taken at meetings and committees
in which women were not present, are not binding for women, to ensure
that women are involved in all key decision-making, while decisions taken
by women’s assemblies cannot be reversed by mixed-gender political struc-
tures (see for example: https://bdpblog.wordpress.com/kadin-meclisi). This
far-reaching autonomy has helped address gender discriminatory practices
and allowed women’s assemblies to negotiate political outcomes to their
own advantage. An intersectional multilayered citizenship analysis highlights
how the strengthening of Kurdish women’s citizenship on the local level of
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participation in women’s assemblies enabled them to participate more
effectively in mixed-gender political fora by giving women representatives
effective decision-making power within these. The multilayered nature of the
nested women’s assemblies (local, regional, national) constitutes a communi-
cation channel between local grassroots women activists and their regional
and national representation, providing a feedback-loop and accountability
between these layers of citizenship.
The women’s quota
A woman’s quota for elected positions within the party was first introduced
in 2000 during the HADEP era, at 25%. While initially its implementation was
not very sucessful, quotas were reinscribed into succeeding pro-Kurdish
political parties’ programmes and the women’s quota increased with each
re-grouping; reaching 35% during the DEHAP period (2003–2005), 40% dur-
ing the Democratic Society Party (DTP) period (2005–2009), increasing to
50% in 2011 when the BDP formed an electoral block with left wing groups.
The women argued that the quota was needed to allow women to partici-
pate in decision-making bodies, to reflect the level of their grassroots activ-
ism: ‘The women have won this right… . because women are fighting on
their own behalf’ (Dȋ lan). Initially, this policy encountered scepticism from
some male party members and activists who argued that, there were ‘not
enough qualified female candidates’ (Avs¸ȋn). It was also suggested that espe-
cially in socially conservative places, the electorate would not support female
candidates. Yet, after gaining seats in parliament the new female MPs
became popular for their careful accountability to local electorates, legitimis-
ing the fielding of female candidates in subsequent elections.
It was not until the 2007 general elections that the quota’s full effects
became evident as the pro-Kurdish rights party gained more seats. Eight of
the 21 (38%) pro-Kurdish DTP MPs were women. This was a significant
achievement as the overall female representation in the parliament of the
ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) was only 9% (C¸aglayan 2013).
Figure 1 shows that all parties increased their share of female MPs in the
last three national elections. Yet, the pro-Kurdish parties HDP/BDP/DTP had
by far the highest representation of female MPs reaching 40% in the June
2015 elections. Out of 550 MPs, 96 were women, 31 of which were from the
pro-Kurdish rights HDP (Nardelli 2015).
Similar trends can be observed for the local elections; in 2009, out of 98
elected pro-Kurdish rights DTP mayors, 14 were women (13.7%). Although,
much lower than the female representation among the party’s MPs, this pro-
portion is much higher than the national average of female mayors, which in
2009 was 0.9% (i.e. only 27 out of 2,948 mayors were female, of which
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almost half were from the DTP) (C¸aglayan 2013). In the local elections in
March 2014 the number of women mayors and councillors peaked at 37, of
whom 23 (60%) were from the pro-Kurdish rights BDP (KA.DER).
While the first women MPs for the pro-Kurdish rights parties tended to be
affiliated with well-known male political dissidents’ cases (C¸aglayan 2007),
they increasingly represented a wider range of social and political back-
grounds. In 2011 the elected women MPs, ranged from MPs with a farming
background, to lawyers. This is an instance, where an intersectional analysis
reveals the importance of gendered political participation in relation to other
social divisions, such as class, educational background and the rural-urban
divide. By widening the range of women in parliament, the pro-Kurdish
rights parties have been able to extend their reach and credibility, contrast-
ing with earlier periods, where mainly young educated Kurdish women were
able to participate in the national movement.
As a result of the 50% quota and pro-Kurdish parties’ electoral gains, the
number of women in formal politics increased considerably and the cohort
of female candidates for the June 2015 elections continued to show this
diversity, since among the HDP’s 550 candidates 268 were women, resulting
in 31 (39%) of its 80 elected MPs being female (Lyons 2015). The HDP female
candidates were more diverse in terms of age, political, social, ethnic, and
religious backgrounds. As the HDP explicitly fosters collaboration between
Turkish left-wing, feminist, pro-democracy and pro-Kurdish rights activists,
the candidates encompassed Turkish feminists as well as MPs who wear a
headscarf and are arguably from a more socially conservative Muslim milieu.
Figure 1. Percentage of elected women parliamentarians by party in general elections 2007,
2011, 2015. Source: KadIn AdaylarI Destekleme Dernegi, KA.DER _Istatistikleri. AKP (Justice and
Development Party), CHP (Republican People’s Party), MHP (Nationalist Movement Party), HDP
(Peoples’ Democratic Party 2015), BDP (Peace and Democracy Party, 2011), DTP (Democratic
Society Party, 2009).
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The increasing visibility of women in formal politics strengthened wom-
en’s confidence not only in their ability to act politically, but also to raise
women’s rights as legitimate subjects of politics:
Well, if someone else makes decisions about you, whoever it may be, they may be
your comrades, they may protect your rights, they may think of your best
interests,… . But when … you are able to express your own demands that gives
great confidence. … I have been to parliament frequently, … the women express
a different joy, and enthusiasm when [a female] leader speaks… she sees herself
there, she says ‘I am here’. That has made women more active, … more politically
involved … . ‘I can do this’. (Dȋlan).
Seeing women parliamentarians in action has drawn the attention of pro-
Kurdish rights activists, but also those affiliated with other or no polit-
ical parties:
My [female] neighbour… . was a supporter of the CHP, however when she saw MP
Gultan Kisanak’s talk on Uludere [the Roboski massacre on 28 December 2011
when Turkish military aircraft killed 34 civilians] in parliament… . she said “I admire
the HDP women, both the neighbourhood activists and the MPs … because as a
CHP supporter I haven’t seen a woman MP stand up and talk with so much
courage” (Lorȋn).
The entry of Kurdish women politicians into parliament and local govern-
ments challenged gendered ethnic stereotypes about Kurdish women. While
public opinion routinely questioned the suitability and capacity of women
politicians from all parties, for Kurdish women, this has been exacerbated.
Due to gendered effects of the Kurdish conflict and longterm underdevelop-
ment of Kurdish regions, Kurdish women are the group with the highest
level of illiteracy (Y€uksel 2006). Widely circulated gendered and racist stereo-
types cast them as more backward, marginalized and limited to family con-
cerns, rather than legitimate participants in public deliberation. These
representations devalued Kurdish women’s ability to act politically and take
public office, questioning whether they could ‘speak publicly? What could [a
Kurdish woman] possibly say beyond the Kurdish issue?’ Despite these
assumptions, Kurdish women politicians developed a distinct style of doing
politics. When becoming MPs, women voiced feminist demands in parlia-
ment, giving these issues a wider audience:
Law proposals about violence against women were made. Many law proposals
were made to bring about the opportunity for women to become subjects of
politics. But beyond this, women MPs raised issues around refugee women, fighting
AIDS, seasonal workers and many other problems. (Avs¸ȋn)
When women MPs raised topics beyond narrowly conceived notions of
‘Kurdish women’s issues’, they furthermore enacted citizenship by bringing
about a new understanding of what can properly be treated as a subject of
politics. For example, a motion condemning the murders of trans-women,
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put forward by an MP of ‘tribal background’, contributed to constituting new
subjects of rights and a widening of what can be conceived as political
within the arena of formal politics. It furthermore challenged the idea that,
as Kurdish women, these MPs would be either too traditional to address
issues such as sexuality or violence against trans people or too bound up in
narrowly conceived identity politics. A situated intersectional analysis demon-
strates how Kurdish women from a range of social locations of class, rural-
urban divisions, and educational hierarchies, were able to challenge the gen-
dered, ethnic stereotypes of Kurdish women as unsuitable subjects of formal
politics. By raising a wide range of political issues, they also challenged the
idea that, as ethnically and gender oppressed political subjects their remit
was limited to only those issues. As Yuval-Davis (2015, 94) points out, such
an idea is based on the normalisation of a ‘hegemonic masculinist
‘positivistic’ positioning.’ Instead, while acknowledging that Kurdish women’s
knowledge and political imagination is situated in their social positionings, it
is important to analytically differentiate between three aspects; their posi-
tionings along socio-economic grids of power; their identifications, and their
normative value systems. While these are related to each other, normative
value systems cannot be automatically read off social positionings or
identifications.
The entry of female pro-Kurdish rights MPs to parliament in sizeable num-
bers, became a lever for other women MPs to negotiate increased female
representation in their political parties (cf. C¸elik 2014). Within the parliamen-
tary all-party ‘Women and Men Equality Commission’ (KEFEK), many women
MPs of other political parties welcomed the impetus of the pro-Kurdish
rights parties’ women’s policies. This illustrates the significance of an inter-
sectional multilayered citizenship analysis: Initially, Kurdish women enacted
their citizenship by gaining recognition as capable of entering formal politics
against the resistance firstly of the Kurdish national movement, challenging
the intersection of ethnic, gendered and rural-urban as well as class stereo-
types that Kurdish women are too traditional. This enacted their rights vis-
a-vis the Kurdish ethnic community. Consequently, however, their entrance
to the formal political arena also affected the layer of women’s citizenship
vis-a-vis the Turkish state. This, in turn, gave impetus to women’s greater
visibility and participation in parliament more generally, affecting also
Turkish women. In this sense, the enactment of citizenship on the layer of
Kurdish community affected that in the layer of citizenship of the
nation-state.
The woman’s quota has significantly encouraged other political parties to
improve women’s representation. Among the major political parties only the
CHP has included a woman’s quota in their party programme, increasing it
to 33% in 2012. The ruling AKP, while recognising that the party’ success
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owes much to their female grassroots activists, in the run up to the 2015
elections rejected a woman’s quota as discriminatory (Elc¸ik 2015). By increas-
ing the representation of women in parliament and local government, the
quota for women in pro-Kurdish rights parties has become an important
instrument to strengthen Kurdish women’s capacity to enact citizenship. As
parliamentarians and local government politicians, Kurdish women have
become subjects with political agency, contradicting the stereotyping of
Kurdish women as limited to the familial realm. They have introduced new
topics to the arena of formal politics, and thereby enacted new subjects of
what and who can count as legitimately political in the public sphere. In
their legislative work, they have furthermore claimed rights for subjects
which had not been hitherto recognised.
The co-chair system
In 2006 the pro-Kurdish rights party DTP for the first time implemented a
policy of appointing two chairs to the party, representing men and women,
with equal responsibilities (Tugluk 2006). The introduction of a co-chair sys-
tem aimed at creating a more gender equal, but also more cooperative, less
hierarchical political culture (C¸elik 2014; Tugluk 2006). Drawing on the
German Green Party’s example who elect a male and female co-chair to the
national party leadership, the women’s movement campaigned to introduce
the co-chair system first at national, subsequently at all levels of the pro-
Kurdish rights party. When initially the co-chair system was ruled illegal, then
DTP co-chair Aysel Tugluk officially stood down in 2007. However, informally
the party continued to practice the co-chair system and widened it to all lev-
els of leadership. While the co-chair system has now been ruled legal for pol-
itical parties as part of the ‘Democratisation Package’ in 2013 (_Ic¸is¸ler
Bakanlıgı 2013), it is not legally recognised within local government or civil
society organizations. A formal proposal to amend existing laws to recognise
the co-chair system put forward by Sebahat Tuncel MP in 2013, argues that
it can improve gendered representation at local and regional government
levels which address environmental, transport, health services, of particular
relevance to women, emphasising that ‘there is no other country practicing
the co-chair system at local government level. In that sense, Turkey has the
opportunity to introduce a change of global significance’ (Tuncel 2013).
In the March 2014 local elections the co-chair system was applied system-
atically, so that of the 101 elected pro-Kurdish rights BDP mayors and coun-
cillors of provinces, districts, and sub-districts, 98 had a co-chair in place.
While lacking legal recognition the co-chair system is being applied despite
and, to an extent, against the state, while satisfying the requirements of
legality, politicians and local governments strive to strengthen their
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gendered politics. Ground rules for its implementation had to be agreed
within the pro-Kurdish rights party, so that co-chairs currently hold the offi-
cial position of being elected as councillors or mayors and are therefore
members of the city council. While it is party policy and practice that both
co-chairs have to agree on decisions, legally the elected mayor or councillor’s
signature of remains binding. The pro-Kurdish rights parties underlined that
co-chairs should not be confused with assistant or deputy-chair, and since
2014, it has been established practice that the official salaries of the mayor
and the councillors are equally split between both co-chairs (_Ilkehaber 2014).
Analysed through an intersectional multilayered citizenship approach, the
practice of co-chairs shows a commitment to increasing women’s participa-
tion in leadership positions at all layers of citizenship and in a range of polit-
ical structures. It also demonstrates the tensions between different layers of
citizenship; while the co-chair system has been established within the
Kurdish national movement, including in political parties, as well as other
political organizations, it has met with resistance at the layers of the state
which has not recognised co-chairs as legitimate within the realm of local
government or civil society organizations. A fuller analysis of the limitations
of Kurdish women’s politics through the tension between identity and recog-
nition is beyond the scope of this article, nevertheless this contradiction
between the national and local layers of citizenship exemplifies the issue to
some extent. It is clearest in the way that co-mayors at local government
level had to find an informal way of splitting salaries, and are not able to
sign legally binding documents, which are regulated by the national state.
This discrepancy between local government, Kurdish community and the
nation-state is a case in point that the enacting of Kurdish women’s citizen-
ship rights is subject to struggles between political actors at these multiple
layers of citizenship. By claiming that the enactment of a co-chair system
would constitute an opportunity for the Turkish nation-state to set a global
example, Sebahat Tuncel MP strives to influence the national level of citizen-
ship through invoking a supra-national community of governance.
As the co-chair system is so far a unique policy, local governments and
pro-Kurdish parties addressed problems as and when they encountered
them, refining the application of the co-chair system in the process. Thus, it
was decided that co-chairs should share an office wherever physic-
ally possible:
The [established political] system leans towards according leadership to males. (… )
For example, in the regional government buildings… we experienced many
problems. The larger office was given to the male and the smaller office to the
female co-chair. And naturally that led to the fact that all visitors to the office were
brought to the male co-chair’s office and that this oriented the centre towards the
male co-chair’s office. When the women noticed this, we immediately intervened and
said that it needs to be one office with two desks opposite of each other. (Avs¸ȋn)
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After the March 2014 local elections, the Turkish mainstream press
acknowledged that the co-chair system encouraged women to engage with
formal politics. For example, co-mayor Berivan Elif Kılıc¸ of Kocak€oy,
Diyarbakir, argued that women were encouraged to approach local institu-
tions (Tabu and Ceylan 2014), while Hatice C¸oban, co-mayor of Van, high-
lighted ‘greater feelings of trust and cooperation’ (C¸iftc¸i 2014).
Yet this had not always been the case. The extent to which the co-chair
system challenged deep-seated gendered expectations is palpable in the ini-
tial confusion among parts of the electorate, who associated masculinity
with the ‘somatic norm’ (Puwar 2004) of politicians:
The people were used to the male ego, the male norm. When all of a sudden they
saw women in the status of chair, people with a feudal culture began to be
puzzled. I am talking of the early times, nowadays there is no such thing. For
example … a female candidate co-chair to the local government told me “We
were visiting villages, and they thought I am the wife of my co-chair … we didn’t
have time to do our election campaign as it took up all our time to explain the
co-chair system. (Dȋlan).
The challenges of explaining the co-chair system during election cam-
paigns elucidate the necessitaty of understanding politics intersectionally:
while campaigning for general elections, the pro-Kurdish rights party instead
had to validate their commitment to gender equality by explaining this pol-
icy to their potential electorate.
The co-chair system impacted beyond the Kurdish movement, as progressive
organizations such as the education trade union Egitim Sen and the public ser-
vice trade union KESK have also introduced it (Evrensel 2014) and other civil
society organizations are considering its implementation. However, the system
is only legally recognised with respect to political parties, so that the co-chair
system’s widening implementation in civil society organizations indicates the
Kurdish women’s movement’s influence on changing normative understandings
of justice and participation despite the state. Through the co-chair system
Kurdish women enact citizenship, bringing into being new forms of doing polit-
ics. This requires engagement with the micropolitics of who is seen as legitim-
ately embodying a political representative; challenging automatic alignment of
leadership with male bodies; and facilitating increased participation of women
in formal party-politics. The blurring of boundaries between formal and informal
politics meant women claimed more representation in formal party politics, and
articulated their concerns as legitimate topics of politics. An intersectional,
multilayered analysis of the co-chair system shows the Kurdish women’s move-
ment’s achievemement of institutionalizing the increased participation of
women in leadership positions on all levels of citizenship. The tension between
the realization of the co-chair system in the Kurdish national movement and
the Turkish nation-state which does not accept it as legally binding, is a case in
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point that Kurdish women’s rights-claiming highlights contradictions between
different levels of citzenship. Nonetheless, the co-chair system’s effect on other
civil society organizations, shows how different layers of citizenship mutually
influence each other, by establishing new standards of gender justice.
Conclusion
Through the three-fold measures of women’s assemblies, quotas and the ori-
ginal development of a co-chair system, the Kurdish women’s movement has
challenged established gender roles in politics and society, creating a new
understanding of Kurdish women as political subjects capable of leadership
and strengthening the voice of the Kurdish women’s movement within the
national movement. This emergent political culture of gender equality, is set-
ting new standards of women’s representation in grassroots and formal polit-
ics in Turkey more widely. Yet, the Kurdish question in Turkey remains
unresolved posing a key obstacle to democracy, including gender rights.
The Kurdish women’s movement has developed primarily within a wider
national movement involved in challenging the Turkish state’s policies
towards the Kurds, and is highly critical of Turkish state institutions more
generally. This raises awareness of intersecting social power relations beyond
gender. The Kurdish women’s movement highlights and challenges the
oppressions and inequalities around ethnic identity and class, as they affect
women and men. It has transformed existing modes and forms of citizenship
on multiple layers, within the family and the neighbourhood scandalizing
issues such as violence against women, domestic violence and intra-familial
power relations. It has also struggled against ethno-national oppression
through its involvement as grassroots activists, guerrilla fighters and key
organizers of a mass movement. By claiming decision-making positions, and
legitimising the focus on gender inequality and women’s rights, it has trans-
formed understandings of justice and freedom within the Kurdish national
movement. The three key measures of women’s assemblies, quotas and the
co-chair system effectively transformed and co-constituted the Kurdish
national movement into one where gender inequality has been recognized
as a key dimension of social and ethno-national oppression. Yet, the close
connection of the Kurdish women’s movement with Kurdish national politics
has also had consequences that have limited their effectiveness, as they are
part of a hierarchical party structure, which can also circumscribe women’s
choices. Women’s role as transmitters of Kurdish language and culture is
celebrated, often foregrounding their role as mothers nurturing their com-
munity (cf. D€OC¸ 2015). Whilst such roles for women differ from traditional
gender roles, at the same time, the Kurdish national movement defines new
versions – and potentially limits – of proper femininity, circumscribing
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women’s ability to reach their full potential as multifaceted complex human
beings, an issue critiqued by Kurdish feminists not affiliated with the Kurdish
national movement (e.g. C¸aglayan 2012).
Kurdish women’s activism has co-created the Kurdish national movement,
establishing institutions and forms of doing politics anchoring a conscious-
ness that gender equality and women’s issues are intimately connected to
democratic ethnic and civil rights. In this sense, the Kurdish women’s move-
ment has contributed a gendered vision to an intersectional multilayered
politics of democratising citizenship. Notwithstanding problematic aspects
mentioned above, the Kurdish women’s movement also testifies to the
importance of gender equality struggles from the global South, their experi-
ences, knowledges and achievements, challenging simplified dichotomies of
West versus Middle East, and the assumption that it is religious identities
rather than complex socio-political factors which affect gender politics.
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